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DING-DONG DITCHED: CULTURES CLASH AS A TOWN 




In the fall of 2015, James Jackson, a Toms River resident, was working 
outside his home.1  A stranger wearing an all-black suit approached Jackson 
with a proposition.2  The man wanted to buy Jackson’s house even though 
the house was not on the market.3  After Jackson refused the offer, the 
conversation, as Jackson claims, became “darker.”4  The man persisted and 
mentioned that Jackson’s neighbors had already sold their homes to him, 
and, in turn, he was going to sell them to Orthodox Jewish families.5  The 
man prodded Jackson by asking why Jackson would want to live in an 
Orthodox neighborhood.6  Jackson described the man’s tactics as “mind 
games.”7 
The encounter described by Jackson in the New York Post is not unique 
to him, as other Toms River residents have experienced similar encounters.8  
The recent increase in unsolicited offers can be traced to the neighboring 
town of Lakewood, New Jersey, which houses the second largest Orthodox 
 
* J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., University of Delaware. Born and raised 
in Toms River, New Jersey.  I would like to thank Professor Sarah Waldeck for all her advice 
and guidance during the writing and editing process of this Comment, and my parents for all 
their love and support.   
 1  Associated Press, Towns Restrict Door-to-Door Solicitation amid Hasidic Influx, N.Y. 
POST (Feb. 23, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://nypost.com/2016/02/23/towns-restrict-door-to-door-
solicitation-amid-hasidic-influx/.   
 2  Id.   
 3  Id.   
 4  Id.   
 5  Id.   
 6  Id.   
 7  Associated Press, supra note 1. 
 8  See PAUL J. SHIVES & KENNETH B. FITZSIMMONS, REPORT ON REAL ESTATE 
CANVASSING ACTIVITIES IN THE TOWNSHIP OF TOMS RIVER 4–9 (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
TOMS RIVER REPORT] ; see also David O’Reilly, Doorbells Ring, Charges Fly at Shore Towns, 
INQUIRER DAILY NEWS (May 1, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly
/news/new_jersey/20160501_Doorbells_ring__charges_fly_at_Shore_towns.html. 
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Jewish population in the United States.9  The Orthodox population is looking 
towards expanding in Toms River because Lakewood is running out of 
space, prices are increasing, and the Orthodox population continues to 
grow.10 
As more and more residents were subjected to real estate solicitations, 
angst in Toms River grew to a boiling point.11  On February 23, 2016, the 
Toms River Township Council yielded to residents’ complaints and banned 
real estate solicitation in the most affected areas, those that border 
Lakewood.12  The town argues it is protecting residents’ privacy and 
protecting its neighborhoods from attempted blockbusting.13  The Orthodox 
population argues Toms River is resisting change and trying to keep the 
Orthodox population out.14 
This Comment will analyze the cease and desist ordinance and address 
the legal challenges that may be brought against it.  Part II will explore 
Lakewood’s history and the growth of the Orthodox population.  Part III will 
examine why Toms River residents fear a changing neighborhood.  Part IV 
will provide an overview of the Toms River ordinance.  Part V will discuss 
blockbusting and the township’s ability to combat the practice.  Part VI will 
analyze potential First Amendment challenges to the ordinance and their 
likelihood of success.  Part VII concludes. 
II. LAKEWOOD AND THE GROWTH OF THE ORTHODOX JEWISH 
POPULATION 
Originally called “Bricksburg,” Lakewood, New Jersey, was first 
settled in the early 1800s on a plot of land that was no more than dense 
forest.15  The settlement grew, and Lakewood was incorporated in 1893.16  
 
 9  O’Reilly, supra note 8. 
 10  Id.; Associated Press, supra note 1; Shannon Mullen, Is Lakewood Growth Slowing 
Down?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 18, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/lo
cal/communitychange/2016/04/14/lakewood-growth-slowing-down/82713230/.   
 11  Alex Napoliello, Toms River Bans Real Estate Solicitation amid Orthodox Jewish 
Boom, NJ.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:21 PM), http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2016
/02/toms_river_bans_real_estate_solicitation_in_2_area.html.   
 12  TOMS RIVER, N.J., MUN. CODE § 391-55(D) (2016), https://ecode360.com/30747352.  
See Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 13  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.   
 14  See Shannon Mullen & Jean Mikle, Culture Shock Over Orthodox Expansion: Surging 
Home Sales in Toms River and Jackson Are a Windfall for Some, a Source of Anxiety for 
Others, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/comm
unitychange/2016/03/18/orthodox-home-sales-jackson-toms-river/81091688/; see also 
Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 15  Charles Mandell, History of Lakewood, http://www.lakewoodnj.gov/history.php (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2017).   
 16  Id.   
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Lakewood became a resort town and retreat for millionaires and other 
influential people, such as the Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, Runyard Kipling, 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and President Grover 
Cleveland.17 
The biggest turning point in Lakewood’s history came in 1943 when 
Rabbi Aaron Kotler opened a yeshiva, Beth Medrash Govoha.18  A yeshiva 
is a Jewish school for religious instruction.19  At its opening, the yeshiva 
accommodated thirteen students.20  Now, Beth Medrash Govoha educates 
more than 6,500 students and is one of the largest yeshivas in the world.21  
As Beth Medrash Govoha grew, so did Lakewood’s Orthodox Jewish 
population.22  According to the 1990 United States Census, Lakewood had a 
population of 45,000 residents.23  In 2000, its population grew to 60,000 
residents.24  In 2010, Lakewood’s population grew to approximately 93,000 
residents, a fifty-four percent increase in population.25  This 32,000 increase 
in residents, between 2000 and 2010, earned Lakewood the distinction of 
being the fastest growing township in New Jersey.26  Since 2010, 
Lakewood’s exponential growth has persisted.  Presently, township officials 
estimate the town population to be approximately 120,000.27  Thus, in six 
years, Lakewood’s population has increased by 27,000 residents, or by thirty 
percent.28  With 4,000 births per year,29 Lakewood’s population is expected 
 
 17  Id.   
 18  Id.   
 19  Yeshiva Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/yeshiva (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).   
 20  Jeanette Rundquist, Lakewood, N.J.’s Fastest-Growing Town, Is Defined by its 
Diversity, STAR-LEDGER (Feb. 6, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/
02/lakewood_is_njs_fastest-growin.html.   
 21  Shannon Mullen, Boom Town: Growth and Conflict in Lakewood, ASBURY PARK 
PRESS (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/jackson-lakewood/2015/08/08/
lakewood-growth-boom-changing-ocean-county/31318143/; Mark Oppenheimer, The 
Beggars of Lakewood, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 19, 2014, at MM40, https://www.nytimes
.com/2014/10/19/magazine/the-beggars-of-lakewood.html.   
 22  Rundquist, supra note 20.   
 23  U.S. Census Bureau, New Jersey Resident Population by Municipality: 1930–1990 
(1990), http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/1990/poptrd6.htm.   
 24  U.S. Census Bureau, Urban and Rural Population: New Jersey, Counties and 
Municipalities Census 2000 (2000), http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/2kcensus/sf1/u
r_pop.pdf.   
 25  U.S. Census Bureau, Total Population: 2000–2010 New Jersey Municipalities (2010), 
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/2010/2010data/totPop.pdf [hereinafter 2010 
Census].   
 26  Id.   
 27  Associated Press, supra note 1.   
 28  See id.; see also O’Reilly, supra note 8.   
 29  See Mullen, supra note 21.   
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to continue to grow and double to 220,000 residents by the year 2030.30  For 
reference, New Jersey’s two biggest municipalities, Newark and Jersey City, 
have populations of 277,000 and 247,000, respectively.31 
Orthodox Jews constitute about sixty percent of Lakewood’s current 
population, which ranks as the second highest Orthodox Jewish population 
in the country behind Brooklyn, New York.32  Much of Lakewood’s growth 
is attributed to Brooklyn Orthodox Jews relocating for a quieter, more 
affordable area with a strong traditional Jewish community already in 
place.33  The twenty-five-square-mile township boasts more than eighty 
synagogues and one hundred religious schools and yeshivas.34  Through the 
first quarter of 2016, the Lakewood Planning Board approved four 
synagogues and three schools, in addition to thirty-eight residential units.35 
Where there is a finite amount of space, an increase in population 
creates a decrease in available space.  With the continued influx of Orthodox 
Jews and the growth of families, Lakewood is running out of space to 
accommodate its new residents.36  Furthermore, the Lakewood real estate 
demand continues to rise, in part, because Orthodox Jews do not drive on the 
Sabbath; therefore, housing near Lakewood’s synagogues is priced at a 
premium.37  Consequently, Orthodox Jews wanting to live in the area have 
turned their sights to towns neighboring Lakewood, such as Toms River.38 
As Orthodox Jews have turned their gaze outside of Lakewood, towns 
neighboring Lakewood have ratcheted up their zoning laws to make it harder 
for yeshivas and synagogues to be opened.39  Yeshivas and synagogues are 
linchpins to an Orthodox Jewish community because Orthodox Jews cannot 
drive on Sabbath; therefore, they must live close enough to walk to their 
yeshivas and synagogues.40  Thus, stunting yeshiva and synagogue 
development makes it less likely that Orthodox Jews will move to a 
particular area.41 
The Toms River Township Council and its governing bodies have taken 
 
 30  Mullen, supra note 10.   
 31  2010 Census, supra note 25.   
 32  O’Reilly, supra note 8.   
 33  See Mullen & Mickle, supra note 14; see also Mullen, supra note 21.   
 34  See Mullen, supra note 21; see also O’Reilly, supra note 8; Mark Di Ionno, Lakewood 
Busing Issues Expose Private School Rides on Public Dollars, STAR LEDGER (May 14, 2017), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/05/lakewood_busing_issues_expose_private
_school_rides.html.   
 35  Mullen, supra note 10.   
 36  See id.   
 37  See O’Reilly, supra note 8.   
 38  Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 39  Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.   
 40  Id.   
 41  See id.   
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similar actions that have fueled speculation that the town is trying to keep 
the Orthodox Jewish community at bay.42  For example, in 2014, a Lakewood 
developer purchased empty acreage near the Lakewood border planning to 
build a temple.43  At the time of the project’s proposal, the property’s zoning 
allowed for churches and synagogues to be built.44  The Toms River Zoning 
Board, however, subsequently rezoned the property for residential use, and 
the town purchased the property from the developer.45 
Additionally, in April 2016, the Toms River Township Council 
approved an ordinance allocating money to purchase fifty-six acres of land 
in the North Dover section of Toms River.46  While billed as the protection 
of undeveloped land, others speculate that Toms River is attempting to 
purchase the land, which falls within the area where the town banned real 
estate solicitation, to remove the possibility of Orthodox Jewish developers 
acquiring the land.47  A Lakewood developer had previously proposed to 
build townhomes and retail space on the property.48 
Finally, in September 2016, the Toms River Township Council 
approved the purchase of an eight-acre horse farm for $900,000.49  Again, 
the land is located in the North Dover area and falls within a cease and desist 
zone.50  The Township Council commented on the importance of preserving 
land in North Dover because of its rapid development.51  Further, in October 
2016, the Toms River Planning Board rejected the subdivision of a three-
acre North Dover property into three lots, which would allow two additional 
homes to be built on the property.52  The property fell within one of the cease 
and desist zones.53  The board reasoned the subdivision would have a 
 
 42  Jean Mikle, Toms River Planners Reject Small Subdivision, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Oct. 
6, 2016, 4:53 P.M.), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/redevelopment/2016/10/06/toms-
river-planners-reject-small-subdivision/91619010/; see Jean Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan 
to Stop Lakewood?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 15, 2016, 7:58 AM), http://www.app.com/s
tory/news/local/redevelopment/2016/04/12/toms-river-spend-103-million-north-dover-land/
82946422/; see also Jean Mikle, Toms River Approves Horse Farm Purchase, ASBURY PARK 
PRESS (Oct. 12, 2016 4:43 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/redevelopment/2016/
10/12/toms-river-approves-horse-farm-purchase/91924484/.   
 43  See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14; see also Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan to Stop 
Lakewood?, supra note 42.  
 44  Id.   
 45  Id.   
 46  Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan to Stop Lakewood?, supra note 42.   
 47  Id.   
 48  Id.   
 49  Mikle, Toms River Approves Horse Farm Purchase, supra note 42.   
 50  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at Appendix A; Google Maps, maps.google.com 
(search “1270 Cox Cro Road, Toms River, NJ 08755”).   
 51  Id.   
 52  Mikle, Toms River Planners Reject Small Subdivision, supra note 42.   
 53  Id.   
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negative impact on the area.54 
 
These past actions will shape how Orthodox Jews view the current 
Toms River ordinance, as some in the Orthodox community question the true 
purpose of the ordinance.55  There is a feeling that real estate agents are being 
used as scapegoats in another attempt to keep the Orthodox Jewish 
community at bay.56  Still, Toms River residents claim to be subjected to 
intense and intimidating solicitations regarding the sale of their homes.57  
Moreover, the residents’ public outcry likely is not simply attributable to 
annoyance or inconvenience; it is probably also rooted in fear.58  Naturally, 
this requires an exploration into why Toms River residents would fear the 
presence of an incoming Orthodox Jewish neighbor. 
III. THE RESIDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE 
In North Dover, front lawns are littered with signs that say “Don’t Sell!  
Toms River Strong.”59  North Dover is at the center of the current 
controversy because it is the Toms River neighborhood bordering 
Lakewood.60  Real estate brokers representing Orthodox Jewish clients have 
been soliciting North Dover homeowners to purchase their homes.61  
Generally, the homes solicited were not on the market for sale.62  While some 
homeowners have happily agreed, or at least acquiesced, to the sale of their 
homes, others have complained about the tactics used by some of the real 
estate brokers.63  Specifically, North Dover homeowners have accused the 
brokers of intense and intimidating direct solicitations.64  Agents have gone 
as far as telling homeowners their plan to turn the homeowners’ 
neighborhood into an Orthodox neighborhood.65 
“Orthodox neighborhood” describes the dynamic of the neighborhood.  
Orthodox communities are especially tight-knit where community members 
take care of one another; however, secular neighbors usually are not included 
 
 54  Id.   
 55  Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 56  Id.  See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14; see also Mullen, supra note 21.   
 57  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.   
 58  See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.   
 59  See Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 60  See TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.   
 61  Napoliello, supra note 11; see TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also 
Associated Press, supra note 1.   
 62  Napoliello, supra note 11; see TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also 
Associated Press, supra note 1.   
 63  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.   
 64  Id.   
 65  See id. at 12.   
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in this sense of community.66  This is because, like the Amish, Orthodox 
Jewish communities are traditionally isolationist or separatist.67  Generally, 
Orthodox Jews “attempt to create a bubble around their community.”68  This 
makes it critical for Orthodox Jews to live close to one another.69 
While signs that say “Don’t Sell!  Toms River Strong” can be 
interpreted as an indignant command,70 the more nuanced interpretation sees 
the signs as a plea rather than a command— “Please, don’t sell because I am 
not ready to sell.”  To Toms River residents, when the first Orthodox Jewish 
person purchases a home in the neighborhood, it signals that more Orthodox 
families will populate the neighborhood and the dynamic of their 
neighborhood, demographically and socially, is facing inevitable change.71  
While non-Orthodox residents may live within an Orthodox neighborhood, 
dramatic cultural differences, such as insularity, make it less attractive for 
current non-Orthodox homeowners to remain, or prospective non-Orthodox 
buyers to purchase homes in the neighborhood.72  Consequently, in the 
remaining homeowners’ minds, it is better to sell early because Orthodox 
Jews are willing to pay more to penetrate the neighborhood real estate 
market; thus, with the only willing buyers being Orthodox Jews, 
homeowners who remain may be at the mercy of whatever the Orthodox 
Jews are willing to pay—whether it be above, equal to, or below market 
value.73  But there is no certainty that future home values will even be 
affected— whether it be positively or negatively.  Therefore, the discussion 
must be broadened beyond home values. 
Toms River residents are hesitant of their new neighbors because Toms 
River residents have witnessed first-hand the issues faced by the growing 
neighboring town of Lakewood.  With most Toms River residents utilizing 
 
 66  This American Life: A Not-So-Simple Majority, CHI. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 12, 2014) 
(downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter This American Life]; Mark Oppenheimer, 
Beggarville, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/
magazine/the-beggars-of-lakewood.html?_r=0; Benjamin Wallace-Wells; Them and Them, 
N.Y. MAG., (Apr. 21, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/east-ramapo-hasidim-2013-4/; 
see Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.   
 67  See AARON J. HAHN TAPPER, JUDAISMS: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INTRODUCTION TO 
JEWS AND JEWISH IDENTITIES 117 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2016); see also This American Life: A 
Not-So-Simple Majority, CHI. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 12, 2014) (downloaded using iTunes).   
 68  HAHN TAPPER, supra note 67, at 117.   
 69  See id.   
 70  As a command, the sign may be interpreted as “Hey!  Don’t sell your home because I 
don’t want to live next to an Orthodox Jew!”  This opens the door for criticism that Toms 
River residents simply do not want to live in a neighborhood with Orthodox Jews for anti-
Semitic reasons.  Obviously, if the command is based on anti-Semitism, then it cannot be 
tolerated.   
 71  See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.   
 72  See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.   
 73  See id.   
GILMORE_FORMATTED2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:17 PM 
482 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:475 
public schools to educate their kids, particularly disconcerting to Toms River 
residents is the decline of Lakewood’s public school system.  In the minds 
of those in the non-Orthodox community, the decline is attributed to the 
growth of the Orthodox Jewish population and a shrinking tax base due to 
the increase of tax-exempt properties. 
First, property taxes are a point of contention.  There is a widely-held 
belief among Toms River residents, and non-Orthodox Lakewood residents, 
that the Orthodox Jewish community fails to pay its fair share of property 
taxes because its synagogues, yeshivas, and other religious properties 
operate as tax-exempt properties.74  In 2015, the Lakewood Township Tax 
Assessor debunked the rumor that the Orthodox Jewish community was 
responsible for “thousands” of tax exempt properties in Lakewood; instead, 
the number of tax exempt properties attributable to the Orthodox Jewish 
community was in the hundreds, approximately 350 properties in total.75 
But approximately eight percent of Lakewood’s total assessed value is 
tax-exempt properties owned by private schools, charities, and religious 
institutions.76  Lakewood has the highest percentage in Ocean County.77  In 
total, these tax-exempt institutions account for $597 million in accessed 
value, and $5.1 million local tax revenue lost.78  Furthermore, the amount of 
these tax-exempt institutions has increased over time, having grown from 
only five percent in 2009.79  In comparison, only one and one-half percent of 
Toms River properties are tax-exempt private schools, charities, and 
religious institutions.80  Therefore, it is likely Toms River residents are 
concerned that an increase in the Toms River Orthodox Jewish population 
will increase the number of tax-exempt properties, thereby increasing the tax 
burden on current residents. 
Property taxes are closely linked to public schools because property 
taxes are what fund public schools.81  The Toms River School District is 
comprised of eighteen total schools: twelve elementary schools, three 
 
 74  See Shannon Mullen, Lakewood: 350 Orthodox Properties Tax-Exempt, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/jackson-lakewood/lakewo
od/2015/10/09/tax-exempt-orthodox-property/73641878/.   
 75  Id.   
 76  Id.  In Lakewood, these tax-free properties include: 181 private schools, 77 
synagogues, 23 churches, 18 dormitories, 52 rabbi residences, and 14 properties that are both 
rabbi residences and synagogues.  Id.   
 77  Id.  Further, Lakewood’s percentage of total tax-exempt properties, which include 
public schools and government-owned property, is seventeen percent— the highest in the 
county.  Id.   
 78  Mullen, supra note 74.   
 79  Id.   
 80  Mullen, supra note 74.   
 81  This American Life, supra note 66. 
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intermediate schools, and three high schools.82  In terms of enrollment, Toms 
River educates 15,934 students83 and is one of the largest school districts in 
New Jersey.84  A majority of Toms River residents rely on the public school 
system to educate their children.85  Adding another layer to the issue, the 
school district has previously betrayed the trust of Toms River residents as 
it was embroiled in one of the biggest New Jersey corruption cases in recent 
history.86  Therefore, Toms River residents are extremely cognizant of the 
public school situation in Lakewood, thus, creating a fear among residents 
that an increased Orthodox population in Toms River will diminish the 
quality and quantity of public schools on which they rely. 
In Lakewood, roughly 30,000 students attend private schools, which 
are tuition-based yeshivas.87  Comparatively, only about 5,900 students 
attend public school, most of which are minorities coming from low-income 
families.88  As is representative of the population, Orthodox Jews make up a 
 
 82  TOMS RIVER REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY FOR THE TOMS RIVER 
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, 16 (2016), http://www.trschools.com/docs/20162209_083511
_8.pdf.   
 83  New Jersey Department of Education, 2016–2017 Enrollment District Reported Data, 
http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/education/data/enr11plus.pl   
 84  See id.  See also New Jersey Department of Education, 2016–2017 Enrollment District 
Reported Data, http://www.state.nj.us/education/data/enr/enr17/county.htm.  Toms River is 
the fifth largest school district based on student population.  Id.  Only Newark, Jersey City, 
Paterson and Elizabeth have larger student populations.  Id.   
 85  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2010, PROFILE OF GENERAL POPULATION AND 
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS (2010), http://www.planning.co.ocean.nj.us/census/2010/MCD_
profiles/2010_DP-1_Toms_river.pdf.  In 2010, there were approximately 20,000 residents 
that were nineteen years old or younger.  Id.  In 2017, 15,934 students attended public schools.  
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 83.  By comparing this data, an 
inference can be made that Toms River residents rely heavily on public schools to educate 
their children as opposed to private schools.   
 86  Matt Friedman, Former Toms River Superintendent Is Sentenced to 11 Years for 
Bribery, Tax Evasion, NJ.COM (Sept. 15, 2012 2:11, PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/
index.ssf/2012/09/former_toms_river_superintendent_is_sentenced_to_11_years_for_briber
y_tax_evasion.html.  In 2010, Toms River Regional School District Superintendent, Michael 
Ritacco, was arrested for taking between $1 to $2 million in bribes and kickbacks for setting 
up inflated insurance contracts, which resulted in the district paying $500,000 to $600,000 
annually in excess fees.  Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Former 
Superintendent of Toms River Regional School District Pleads Guilty to Corruption and Tax 
Fraud Charges (Apr. 5, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newark/press-
releases/2012/former-superintendent-of-toms-river-regional-school-district-pleads-guilty-to-
corruption-and-tax-fraud-charges.  Ritacco pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud and 
conspiracy to defraud the IRS.  Id.  In September 2012, Ritacco was sentenced to eleven years 
and three months in prison.  Friedman, supra note 86.   
 87  Di Ionno, supra note 34.   
 88  NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, LAKEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT 
ENROLLMENT DATA (2017), http://www.state.nj.us/education/ (select “Data”; then 
“Enrollment”; then “2016-2017”; then “District”; scroll down and select “Ocean”; and finally 
select “Lakewood Township”).  Further illustrating the financial situation of public school 
families, 4,087.5 of 5,853.5 public school students qualify for the Free Lunch program.  Id.  
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majority of Lakewood’s Board of Education.89  This creates an interesting 
dynamic because Orthodox Jewish children do not attend Lakewood’s public 
schools.90  Such a dynamic creates tension between public school families 
and Orthodox Jews sitting on the Board.  With a multi-million dollar 
Lakewood School District budget deficit,91 tensions run high between public 
school parents and the Lakewood Board of Education because budget cuts 
have left the public schools under-resourced and overcrowded.92 
Recently, student busing has caused frustration because transportation 
costs have largely been responsible for the budget deficit.93  In New Jersey, 
there are two types of busing: mandatory and courtesy.94  The State requires 
mandatory busing for students living more than two miles away from their 
school, whether the school is public or private.95  Thus, by law, Lakewood 
School District is required to bus about 21,000 of the 30,000 private school 
students because these students live more than two miles from their 
schools.96 
Courtesy busing may be provided by the district to students living less 
than two miles from their school, public or private; however, the school 
district is solely responsible for footing the bill of courtesy busing.97  While 
about 7,000 private school students use courtesy busing,98 about 3,000 of the 
 
This equates to 69.8% of students attending Lakewood public schools.   
 89  See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Meir Rinde, Is Lakewood on the Verge of a 
Meltdown?, NJSPOTLIGHT (June 21, 2016), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/16/06/20/is-
lakewood-on-the-verge-of-a-meltdown/.   
 90  See Di Ionno, supra note 34.   
 91  Rob Spahr, Christie Signs Bill to Fund Busing for Lakewood’s Private Schools, 
NJ.COM (Aug. 9, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2016/08/christie_signs
_bill_to_publicly_fund_busing_for_la.html.   
 92  Rob Spahr, NJ School District in Crisis: 5 Things to Know, NJ.COM (Feb. 12, 2016 
6:58 PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2016/02/nj_school_district_in_crisis_5_things
_to_know.html.  See Rinde, supra note 89.  In 2014, the New Jersey Department of Education 
appointed a fiscal monitor to oversee the Lakewood School District’s finances and fix its 
budget.  Nicholas Huba, State Sends Fiscal Monitor to Lakewood, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 
26, 2014), http://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/taxes/2014/04/25/state-
send-fiscal-monitor-to-lakewood-school-district/8162327/.   
 93  Spahr, supra note 91.   
 94  N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6A:27-1.4(a), 1.5(a) (2017).   
 95  § 6A:27-1.4(a)(1).  For high school students, the distance is increased to two and one-
half miles.  Id.   
 96  Payton Guion, Lakewood Busing: Oversight Committee Knows Little About 
Consortium, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.app.com/story/
news/local/communitychange/2017/01/17/lakewood-busing-oversight-committee-knows-
little-consortium/96241244/.   
 97  § 6A:27-1.5(a).   
 98  Shannon Mullen, NJ Senate Oks Aid for Lakewood Private School Busing, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (June 24, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/2016/06/
23/senate-busing-singer-lakewood-schools/86308310/.   
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nearly 6,000 public school students rely on courtesy busing to get to school.99  
In total, Lakewood’s transportation costs for both mandatory and courtesy 
busing reached $23.9 million for the 2015–2016 school year.100 
In early 2016, confronting a twelve-million-dollar budget deficit for the 
2016–2017 school year, the Lakewood Board of Education was set to 
eliminate seventeen staff positions, including ten teaching positions, some 
middle-school activities, and courtesy busing.101  Such cuts have increased 
tensions between public school families and the Board as public school 
families felt disproportionately affected.102 
For instance, the proposed elimination of courtesy busing would have 
affected public school students far more than private school students.  While 
a greater number of private school students (7,000) rely on courtesy busing, 
only about one-fourth, or twenty-five percent, of private school children 
would have been affected.103  Further, it has been argued that because of the 
tight-knit nature of the Orthodox community, the private school parents were 
better equipped to deal with the elimination of courtesy busing through 
community coordinated car pools.104 
Alternatively, while the overall number of public school students 
(3,000) affected by cuts to courtesy busing is less than private school 
students, the proportional number of public school students is far greater than 
private school students because roughly one-half, or fifty percent, of public 
school students rely on courtesy busing to get to school.105  The non-
Orthodox community, made up of mostly African American and Latino 
families, lack the support system seen in the Orthodox community.106  
Therefore, with the elimination of courtesy busing, many public school 
students are without an alternative means to get to school because their 
 
 99  Id.   
 100  Spahr, supra note 91.   
 101  Shannon Mullen, Lakewood Monitor Imposes Teacher, Busing Cuts, ASBURY PARK 
PRESS (May 12, 2016, 5:58 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/in-our-
schools/2016/05/12/lakewood-monitor-imposes-teacher-busing-cuts/84282406/.   
 102  Shannon Mullen, Lakewood Budget Plan Cuts 68 Teachers, Courtesy Busing, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:43 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/2016/03
/21/lakewood-budget-cuts-teachers-busing/82090816/; Shannon Mullen, Lakewood School 
Board Votes to Save Courtesy Busing, Override Still Possible, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Feb. 18, 
2016, 12:54 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/communitychange/2016/
02/17/lakewood-courtesy-busing-township-surplus/80449846/; Spahr, supra note 92; see 
Mullen, supra note 101; see also Rinde, supra note 89.   
 103  Rinde, supra note 89; see Shannon Mullen, New Lakewood Bus Program is $1M Short, 
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Sept. 2, 2016, 8:05 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/in-
our-schools/2016/09/01/lakewood-busing-private-consortium/89654944/; see also Spahr, 
supra note 92.   
 104  Rinde, supra note 89.   
 105  See Spahr, supra note 91.   
 106  See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Rinde, supra note 89.   
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parents do not know how to drive, or their parents cannot afford to own a 
car.107  This is just one example of why tensions have grown between public 
school parents and the Orthodox community. 
Lakewood school officials argue the blame belongs to the State because 
the funding formula accounts only for public school students, but disregards 
private school students, leading to the State underfunding of the school 
district.108  In August 2016, New Jersey enacted legislation to help rectify 
the busing situation.109 
While Orthodox Jewish residents lack the clout in Toms River to affect 
the school budget, the current situation in Lakewood cannot be comforting 
to Toms River residents, especially since the situation in Lakewood is not an 
anomaly.  In East Ramapo, New York, the public-school parents have 
accused the mostly Orthodox-led board of cutting public school budgets, 
negatively impacting their children, and favoring private religious schools.110  
The East Ramapo School District has gone as far as closing two public 
schools, which, in turn, were sold to private Orthodox yeshivas.111 
Again, the issues facing Lakewood and East Ramapo are not likely to 
affect Toms River in the immediate future.  Toms River residents, however, 
are beginning to experience the effects an increased Orthodox Jewish 
population has on the school district, such as increased private busing 
costs.112  Further, with property values generally tied to public schools,113 it 
stands to reason that an increase of the Toms River Orthodox Jewish 
population is nerve-racking to Toms River homeowners. 
Beside annoyance, the fears described above drive the public outcry 
 
 107  See Rinde, supra note 89.   
 108  Spahr, supra note 92. 
 109  Id.  The State will provide the Lakewood School District $7.2 million over three years, 
or $2.4 million a year, for the purposes of transporting students to private schools.  Spahr, 
supra note 91.  The Lakewood Busing consortium was formed for the 2016–2017 school year 
and will be responsible for busing private school students at a cost of $16 million per year— 
$2.4 million funded by the state, and the remaining $14.4 million funded by local taxpayers.  
Payton Guion, Lakewood Busing: Oversight Committee Knows Little About Consortium, 
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/local
/communitychange/2017/01/17/lakewood-busing-oversight-committee-knows-little-
consortium/96241244/.   
 110  This American Life, supra note 66.   
 111  Id.   
 112  Mike Davis, The Next Lakewood? Jackson, Other Districts Face Booming Private Bus 
Costs, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/inve
stigations/watchdog/education/2017/04/27/nj-aid-in-lieu-of-school-transportation-nonpublic
-lakewood/100616474/.   
 113  Michele Lerner, School Quality Has a Mighty Influence on Neighborhood Choice, 
Home Values, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/sch
ool-quality-has-a-mighty-influence-on-neighborhood-choice-home-values/2015/09/03/826
c289a-46ad-11e5-8ab4-c73967a143d3_story.html?utm_term=.6ab1530a7ded.   
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when confronting the intense real estate solicitations Toms River residents 
have experienced.  After receiving a substantial amount of complaints, Toms 
River took action and passed an ordinance addressing real estate solicitation, 
specifically targeting the North Dover area.114 
IV. THE TOMS RIVER ORDINANCE 
In 2004, Toms River passed its original “no-knock” ordinance that 
banned door-to-door canvassing and solicitation.115  Toms River passed this 
ordinance in the interest of public safety after the murder of a Toms River 
resident by a solicitor from out of town.116  The ordinance created a registry 
in which residents could enroll if they did not want to be subjected to door-
to-door solicitations.117  Additionally, solicitors were required to obtain a 
license from the Toms River Clerk’s office.118  Solicitors who violated this 
ordinance by soliciting residents on the registry were subject to fines, up to 
$1,250,119 and penalties, such as revocation of their solicitor’s license and/or 
ineligibility to apply for a new license.120  Interestingly, the original “no-
knock” ordinance did not specifically mention real estate solicitations.121 
The second iteration of the “no-knock” ordinance was passed in 
2015.122  After many residents complained of real estate brokers soliciting 
door-to-door, using “intrusive, intimidating, and questionable tactics,”123 
Toms River adopted an ordinance to specifically outlaw real estate 
solicitations.124  The ordinance achieved three results.  First, the ordinance 
made real estate solicitation subject to Toms River’s general soliciting 
ordinances, requiring real estate solicitors to obtain solicitation permits.125  
Second, the ordinance explicitly prohibited blockbusting.126  Third, the 
ordinance expanded the “no-knock” registry to apply to real estate 
 
 114  TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(A)–(D) (2017); see 
Napoliello, supra note 11.   
 115  See id. § 391-36.1.   
 116  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2; Phil Stilton, How a Grisly Murder Shaped 
Toms River’s No-Knock Ordinance, SHORENEWSNETWORK.COM (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www
.shorenewsnetwork.com/2015/10/how-a-grisly-murder-shaped-toms-rivers-no-knock-ordina
nce/.   
 117  § 391-36.1.   
 118  Id. § 391-31.   
 119  Id. § 391-36.1(D)(1).   
 120  Id. § 391-36.1(D)(2)–(3).   
 121  See id. § 391-36.1.   
 122  §§ 391-48–52.   
 123  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.   
 124  §§ 391-48–52.   
 125  Id. § 391-49.   
 126  Id. § 391-51.  For a thorough discussion of blockbusting, see infra Part VI.   
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solicitations and canvasing.127 
 
 
Despite the Town’s revisions to the “no-knock” ordinance, residents 
were still subject to unwanted real estate solicitations by permitted and 
unpermitted solicitors.128  Further, the “no-knock” ordinance did not 
discourage solicitors from engaging residents on their front lawns or in the 
streets.129  Yet again, Toms River revised its “no-knock ordinance.”130  In 
November 2015, the town adopted an ordinance authorizing the Township 
Council to ban real estate solicitations in certain areas of the town that were 
subject to excessive and unwarranted solicitations.131 
This new ordinance required the town to fulfill certain procedural steps 
to determine whether a solicitation ban was warranted.132  First, the Business 
Administrator and Township Attorney must conduct an investigation and the 
town must hold a public hearing to allow residents to express concerns over 
incidents of real estate solicitation.133  Next, the Business Administrator and 
Township Attorney must release a report that explains their findings, 
recommends whether a solicitation ban should be adopted, and, if so, 
specifies the geographic area the ban covers.134  After considering the report, 
the Township Council may impose a real estate solicitation ban for certain 
neighborhoods if it finds either of the following are present: (1) real property 
owners are subject to “intense and repeated” real estate solicitations for the 
sale of their homes; or (2) real property owners are subjected to 
discriminatory practices under section 391-51, which includes 
blockbusting.135 
Once a cease and desist zone is established, real estate brokers are 
prohibited from soliciting the sale of real estate within the zone’s boundaries 
as set out in the ordinance.136  Additionally, these zones cannot prohibit 
solicitation for more than five years.137  The cease and desist zone, however, 
may be re-established through the same procedural requirements used to 
create the zone in the first instance.138  Penalties for solicitation include fines 
 
 127  Id. § 391-50.   
 128  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.   
 129  Id.   
 130  § 391-55(A)–(C).   
 131  Id.   
 132  Id. § 391-55(A).   
 133  Id. § 391-55(B).   
 134  Id. § 391-55(C)(1).   
 135  Id.   
 136  TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(C)(2)–(3) (2017).   
 137  Id. § 391-55(C)(5).   
 138  Id.   
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of up to $1250 per offense and/or revocation of any permit issued under the 
ordinance.139 
 
On February 23, 2016, the Toms River Township Council passed an 
ordinance creating two cease and desist zones, wherein all real estate 
solicitation would be banned.140  The two zones encompass the North Dover 
neighborhoods, which both border Lakewood.141  Toms River satisfied the 
requirements necessary before establishing these cease and desist zones.142  
After conducting an investigation and a public hearing,143 the Business 
Administrator and Township Attorney released their report, which pointedly 
stated “neighborhoods in the Township’s northwest quadrant have been 
heavily and repeatedly targeted for real estate solicitations.”144  The report 
further found incidents of illegal behavior, such as blockbusting.145  The 
report recommended that cease and desist zones should be established 
because the real estate solicitations were “ero[ding]” the residents’ quality 
of life.146 
V. BLOCKBUSTING 
Blockbusting is defined as the “act or practice, [usually] by a real-estate 
broker, of persuading one or more property owners to sell their property 
quickly, and often at a loss, to avoid an imminent influx of minority 
groups.”147  Blockbusting arose after the ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, where 
the United States Supreme Court struck down restrictive covenants which 
prohibited the sale of a home to buyers of a particular race.148  Before Shelley, 
property owners could enter into restrictive covenants that prevented 
minorities from buying or renting property in a neighborhood.149  These 
 
 139  § 391-53.   
 140  Id. § 391-55(D).   
 141  Id.  See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391 Attachment 1:1 
(2017).   
 142  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.   
 143  The public hearing was held on January 21, 2016, in the Toms River Town Hall.  Jean 
Mikle, Toms River to Introduce Cease and Desist Ordinance, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Feb. 9, 
2016 9:47 A.M.), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/toms-river-area/2016/02/08/toms-riv
er-introduce-cease-and-desist-ordinance/80024206/.   
 144  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.   
 145  Id.  (“The evidence further established credible incidents of blockbusting and other 
suspicious behavior—in some cases tantamount to stalking or harassment—creating an 
atmosphere in which residents feel under siege, unsafe, and unduly pressured to sell their 
homes.”).   
 146  Id.   
 147  Blockbusting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
 148  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).   
 149  Id. at 4.   
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covenants could be used by the homeowner to prevent sale to a minority, or 
could be enforced by third-party homeowners in the neighborhood if a 
homeowner tried selling or renting a home to a minority.150 
After Shelley, blockbusting became a method of integrating segregated 
neighborhoods by creating a means for black entry into white 
neighborhoods.151  Blockbusting grew in popularity because realtors used it 
as a way to generate profit.152  Usually, blockbusting occurred in white 
neighborhoods bordering black ghettos.153  Using the climate of the time to 
their advantage, real estate brokers incited fear into white homeowners by 
claiming minorities were moving into their neighborhood.154  Many times, 
brokers would offer cash for homes.155  By using these methods, real estate 
brokers were able to purchase homes from white homeowners at a discount, 
and then turn around and sell to black homebuyers for a profit.156 
The practice continued unabated until Congress made blockbusting an 
illegal practice under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.157  The Fair Housing Act 
outlaws inducement of home sales, “for profit,” in anticipation of entry or 
prospective entry of persons into the neighborhood based on certain 
characteristics, such as race and religion.158  While not defined by the Fair 
Housing Act, “for profit” has been interpreted to mean any form of financial 
gain.159  In addition, district courts have found inducements need not be 
explicit to constitute blockbusting, but that the acts and words should be 
interpreted as a reasonable man would in the circumstances.160 
At the state level, New Jersey followed the federal government’s lead 
and outlawed blockbusting through its Law Against Discrimination Act 
(LAD).161  New Jersey’s law is more comprehensive than the federal statute 
and creates a broader umbrella under which actions may constitute 
 
 150  Id. at 6–7.   
 151  See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 37–38 (1993).   
 152  Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based 
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998).   
 153  Id. at 1151.   
 154  Id. at 1151–52.   
 155  Id. at 1151.   
 156  Id.   
 157  42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).   
 158  Id.   
 159  See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 294 (D. Md. 1974) (finding that a sale 
of property where the agent was entitled to a real estate commission was “for profit” under 
the Fair Housing Act); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1311–12 (D. Md. 1969) 
(interpreting “for profit” to include entitlements to commissions for real estate sales).   
 160  Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d and remanded sub 
nom. Zuch v. John H. Hussey Co., 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mitchell, 
327 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1971).   
 161  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(k) (2017).   
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blockbusting.162  By analyzing the state statute, it becomes clear that three 
requirements are necessary for words or actions to qualify as blockbusting.  
First, an individual must attempt to induce a transaction from which they 
may gain financially.163  This language seems much broader than the Fair 
Housing Act’s requirement that the inducement must be made “for profit.”164  
Second, there must be a representation that a change has, will, or may occur 
in the composition of an area.165  The LAD enumerates a list of 
characteristics for which representations may not be made, such as race, 
creed, and color.166  Third, an additional representation must be made, 
directly or indirectly, to suggest that these changes may lead to undesirable 
consequences to the area.167  An undesirable consequence includes but is not 
limited to, a decrease in property value, increase in crime or anti-social 
behavior, or decrease in quality of schools.168  The statute does not require 
the actual occurrence of any of these consequences, just a representation that 
they may occur.169 
Furthermore, the New Jersey Real Estate Commission has adopted 
rules against blockbusting.170  The regulation prohibits the solicitation of 
residential property based on an alleged change of value relating to the entry, 
or prospective entry, of “another race, religion, or ethnic origin” into the 
neighborhood.171  Unlike the Fair Housing Act or LAD, these rules apply 
only to licensed real estate agents.172  Yet, like the LAD, a change in property 
values need not actually occur, but only be represented.173  Additionally, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has held municipalities are allowed to pass anti-
blockbusting ordinances.174  In Summer v. Teaneck, the court reasoned that 
municipalities were better situated than the State to uncover blockbusting 
because blockbusting depends on the locality, varying in its “intensity and 
 
 162  See id.   
 163  Id.   
 164  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012) (“For profit”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(k) 
(2017) (“may gain financially”).   
 165  § 10:5-12(k).   
 166  Id.  The statute includes the following characteristics: race, creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, familial status, 
pregnancy, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual orientation, disability, 
nationality.  Id.   
 167  Id.   
 168  Id.   
 169  Id.   
 170  Id.   
 171  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-7.4(a) (2017).   
 172  Id.   
 173  Id.   
 174  See Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 765–67 (N.J. 1969); see also 
Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 236 A.2d 874, 880–82 (N.J. 1967).   
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hurt.”175  Therefore, because municipalities were closer to the scene of the 
blockbusting, municipalities are better equipped to craft a strategy to solve 
their unique blockbusting problem.176  Additionally, the court believed the 
“evils” of blockbusting were too cancerous to not allow the municipalities to 
combat such acts.177  Thus, it is apparent from statutes and case law that 
blockbusting is illegal,178 and that municipalities, such as Toms River, have 
a right to pass ordinances generally prohibiting blockbusting.179  
Nonetheless, the issue becomes whether the real estate brokers’ actions 
amount to blockbusting. 
To start, the geography of the current neighborhoods draws 
comparisons of those subject to blockbusting in the 1950s.  The Toms River 
neighborhoods encountering the alleged blockbusting are those bordering 
the Orthodox Jewish community in Lakewood;180 likewise, the 1950s 
neighborhoods targeted for blockbusting bordered minority, often black, 
neighborhoods.181  The situations contrast, however, when looking at the 
reasoning inciting fear.  In the 1950s and 1960s, real estate agents 
predominately preyed on white homeowners’ real or assumed fears that 
black neighbors would bring increased crime and decreased safety to their 
neighborhood.182  This, in the homeowners’ minds, decreased property 
values.183 
To Toms River residents, an increase in crime is not fueling their fears 
because Lakewood has seen a decrease in crime since the growth of the 
Orthodox Jewish population.184  Instead, Toms River residents likely fear a 
 
 175  Summer, 251 A.2d at 764.   
 176  Id.   
 177  Id.  In describing the pitfalls of blockbusting, the court explained: 
The inducement is the supposed loss in property values for those who 
remain.  The evils are evident.  Sellers are exploited, and hostility is 
excited both in those who are persuaded their economic interests are 
thus threatened and in the group of citizens who are given to understand 
their presence is a blight.   
Id. at 764. 
 178  See N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 10:5-12(k) (2017).   
 179  Summer, 251 A.2d at 765–67.   
 180  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.   
 181  Massey & Denton, supra note 151, at 37–38.   
 182  Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52. 
 183  Id.  
 184  Compare FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2016), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s (select “2016”; then “Crime in the U.S. 2016”; then 
“Table 6”; then “New Jersey”) (169 violent crimes reported), with FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s 
(select “2000”; then “Table 8 – Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City 10,000 and 
over, 2000”; then scroll down to “New Jersey”; and then “Lakewood”) (240 violent crimes 
reported). 
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decrease in property values because of an increase of anti-social behavior 
and decline in schools serving the area.185  This can be gleaned from the 
Toms River code addressing blockbusting.186  In the code, solicitations 
cannot be made when making specific representations that incite fear or 
panic to the homeowner.187  Classic elements of blockbusting are noted, such 
as representations about decreasing property values, changes in the 
demographic of the neighborhood, and increase in crime rates.188  As in the 
LAD, however, additional representations cannot be made about “an 
increase in . . . antisocial behavior in the area”189 or “a decline in the quality 
of schools serving the area.”190  Those two additional representations 
illustrate Toms River residents’ underlying fears regarding the influx of the 
Orthodox Jewish community; the underlying fears are related. 
As previously mentioned, residents have complained of intense, 
intimidating, and unwanted solicitations for the sale of their homes.191  A 
simple knock on the door from an unwanted real estate solicitor, however, 
does not constitute blockbusting because the solicitor must invoke elements 
of fear or panic in convincing the homeowner to sell his or her home.192  
Certainly, some of the interactions between homeowners and real estate 
agents fit this bill.  For example, one homeowner was told “you wouldn’t 
want to live here when [I am] done”,193 while another was told, “You really 
should sell your house.  I’m sure you don’t want to be surrounded by 
Jews.”194  Similarly, another homeowner was told, “We’re ready to buy the 
whole neighborhood[,]”195 and asked, “Why do you want to live with us?”,196 
meaning Orthodox Jewish neighbors.  Further, residents have described 
frequent “drive-bys” where agents took pictures of their homes.197  These 
comments and actions seem to invoke elements of blockbusting because 
these real estate agents are trying to induce the sale of homes by the 
threatened entry of the Orthodox Jewish population.  But, as admitted in the 
 
 185  See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-51(B)(3)–(4) (2017). 
 186  Id. § 391-51(B). 
 187  Id. § 391-51(G).   
 188  Id. § 391-51(B).  
 189  Id.  
 190  Id.  
 191  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. 
 192  See Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52. 
 193  O’Reilly, supra note 8. 
 194  Shannon Mullen & Jean Mikle, Culture Shock Over Orthodox Expansion: Home Sales 
in Toms River and Jackson Are a Windfall for Some, A Source of Anxiety for Others, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/communitychange/2016/
03/18/orthodox-home-sales-jackson-toms-river/81091688/. 
 195  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
 196  Id.  
 197  Id. at 13; O’Reilly, supra note 8. 
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Toms River Report, it is not evident that blockbusting is prevalent 
throughout the area—meaning not all real estate agents soliciting home sales 
are employing blockbusting tactics.198 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, real estate agents used fear tactics to induce 
white homeowners to sell their homes at a below value price.199  While not 
statutorily required to prove blockbusting, home sales below market value 
can be an indication of the practice.200  In Toms River, reports have shown 
that homes in the cease and desist zones are receiving higher purchase offers 
and are being purchased above their assessed value.201  In some instances, 
houses in neighborhoods bordering Lakewood have sold for $50,000 to 
$250,000 above their accessed value.202  Yet, the inducement for a 
homeowner to sell his or her home is the supposed loss of property value if 
he or she remains.203  Therefore, it is possible that the economic effects of 
blockbusting are not felt by the homeowners that sell first, but by those 
clinging onto their old neighborhood and sell last.  While homes are selling 
well above their market value, real estate solicitation by the Orthodox Jewish 
community is a relatively new issue facing Toms River, and the homes being 
sold are usually one of the first few homes sold in the neighborhood. 
It should be stated, however, that future housing prices are unknown.  
It is uncertain whether property values will decrease for those remaining in 
a transitionary neighborhood.  For instance, as the Orthodox Jewish 
population has increased, Lakewood’s property values have increased 
because it has become a desirable location for Orthodox Jews to live.204  
Therefore, it seems possible that property values in newly transitioned Toms 
River neighborhoods will not decrease because the remaining non-Orthodox 
houses will become desirable properties for Orthodox Jewish families. 
Yet, blockbusting does not require an actual decrease in property 
values; it only requires a representation, direct or indirect, that undesirable 
consequences, including decreased property values, shall follow the entry of 
a religious group (i.e. Orthodox Jews) into the neighborhood.205  Statements, 
such as “[you] wouldn’t want to live here when [I’m] done”, made to Toms 
River homeowners by real estate agents,206 seem to insinuate certain 
 
 198  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 13. 
 199  See Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52.  
 200  See id. 
 201  Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.  
 202  Id.  
 203  Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 762 (N.J. 1969). 
 204  Mullen, supra note 10; Rinde, supra note 89; Associated Press, supra note 1; see also 
Mullen, supra note 21. 
 205  See N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-12(k) (2017); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).  
 206  O’Reilly, supra note 8. 
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undesirable consequences facing the homeowner’s neighborhood and are 
clearly made as an inducement to sell.  These statements implicate the very 
evils blockbusting statutes try to prevent: the incitement of hostility between 
those who believe their economic interest is threatened and the incoming 
population who “understand [its] presence [to be] a blight.”207 
Therefore, it is a town’s responsibility to end potential blockbusting 
practices in their infancy before they become a wide spread issue and their 
cancerous effect infects the town and its residents.  Consequently, it does not 
make sense for Toms River to have to wait for the practice to become 
prevalent to take action against it because, at that point, it will become too 
late to rectify.  The Toms River ordinance seems to accomplish the goal of 
preventing blockbusting in the cease and desist zones; however, the cease 
and desist zones also prevent non-blockbusting solicitors from soliciting 
homeowners for the sale of their homes in those zones.208  Thus, the next 
question to address is whether the cease and desist zone would withstand 
constitutional challenges by law-abiding solicitors. 
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE TOMS RIVER ORDINANCE 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”209  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has divided speech into two different 
categories: (1) commercial speech, and (2) non-commercial speech.210  In 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, the Court defined commercial speech as 
speech that puts forth a commercial transaction,211 and in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, the Court also defined 
commercial speech as speech for the speaker’s economic benefit.212  Until 
1975, the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.213  Then, in 
Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment’s 
protection to commercial speech, protecting it from government 
regulation.214  These First Amendment protections are applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.215  The Court has refused to allow the 
 
 207  Summer, 251 A.2d at 762.  See N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 
836 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating the evils of blockbusting include the “fanning of racial tensions 
and promoting of ethnic stereotypes”). 
 208  TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(c)(3) (2016), 
http://ecode360.com/30316219 
 209  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 210  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
 211  Id. at 66. 
 212  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 213  Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65. 
 214  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63. 
 215  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
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government to adopt a “highly paternalistic” role over commercial speech.216 
While commercial speech is protected, the Court makes a 
“commonsense” distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
speech.217  In Central Hudson, the Court ruled that commercial speech is not 
afforded full First Amendment protection under the Constitution, but a lesser 
protection than other forms of speech or expression, such as non-commercial 
speech.218  To determine whether commercial speech is constitutionally 
protected, the Court considers two factors: (1) the nature of the speech or 
expression, and (2) the government’s interest in regulating the speech or 
expression.219 
The First Amendment governs commercial speech because advertising 
serves an informational function to consumers.220  The Court ruled that the 
Constitution will not protect commercial speech “more likely to deceive the 
public than inform it,221 or commercial speech pertaining to illegal 
activity.222  But, where the speech is not misleading or does not perpetuate 
illegal activity, the government’s power in regulating commercial speech is 
limited by Central Hudson.223  Therefore, to regulate commercial speech, the 
government must satisfy the Central Hudson framework.224  Further, the 
state must articulate a substantial interest achieved through the restriction of 
the commercial speech.225  Finally, the restriction on commercial speech 
must be in proportion to the state’s interest.226  In measuring adherence to 
the proportionality requirement, courts look to two factors.227  First, the 
state’s interest must be “directly advance[d]” by the restriction on 
commercial speech.228  This means “ineffective or remote support” of the 
state’s interest is insufficient to justify a restriction on commercial speech.229  
 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976)). 
 216  Id. at 562 (rejecting the view that the government has “complete power to suppress or 
regulate commercial speech” and reasoning that people recognize their own best interests by 
being informed and, therefore, opening the channels of communication is the best way to 
achieve that end). 
 217  Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). 
 218  Id. at 562–63. 
 219  Id. at 563. 
 220  See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
 221  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 222  Id. at 564; Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). 
 223  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 224  Id. at 563–66. 
 225  Id. at 564. 
 226  Id.  
 227  Id. at 564–65. 
 228  Id. at 564.  
 229  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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Second, the restriction cannot be over-inclusive.230  A restriction will be 
struck down if a more limited restriction would have advanced the state’s 
interest in the same manner.231 
 
The Central Hudson framework creates a four-part analysis to 
determine whether certain commercial speech enjoys First Amendment 
protection.232  The Court considers whether: (1) the speech concerns 
unlawful activity or is misleading; (2) the state has a substantial interest; (3) 
the restriction is directly related to the state’s interest; and (4) the restriction 
is not broader than necessary.233 
The Second Circuit has applied the Central Hudson framework when 
interpreting the constitutionality of solicitation bans in certain 
communities.234  In drafting its ordinance, Toms River relied upon a New 
York law allowing the creation of cease and desist zones to stop real estate 
solicitation235 and Second Circuit opinions interpreting the law.236  Under 
New York law, the Secretary of State may combat intense and repeated 
solicitations by issuing a non-solicitation order for certain areas237 or by 
creating cease and desist zones, which ban solicitation where residential 
homeowners submit statements expressing their request to not be solicited 
by real estate brokers.238  It is important to note the difference between the 
two types of solicitation restrictions.  A non-solicitation order creates a 
blanket ban over an area for real estate solicitation, meaning no property 
falling within the area covered by the order can be solicited by a real estate 
agent.239  In contrast, a cease and desist zone allows residents in that area to 
opt into the real estate solicitation ban, and real estate agents may not solicit 
residents who have opted into the cease and desist zone.240  Real estate 
agents, however, may still solicit residents that have not filed a statement 
with the secretary expressing their intent to participate in the cease and desist 
zone.241 
 
 230  Id.   
 231  Id.  
 232  Id. at 566. 
 233  Id.  
 234  See Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2002); see also N.Y. State Ass’n of 
Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 235  N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-(h)(2)–(3) (2002).  
 236  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 456. 
 237  N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h(2) (2002). 
 238  § 442-h(3). 
 239  § 442-h(2); see N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 240  N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h(3) (2002). 
 241  Id.  
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In New York State Association of Realtors v. Shaffer (NYSAR), real 
estate agents challenged the constitutionality of a non-solicitation order that 
banned real estate solicitation in certain areas of four New York counties.242  
In Anderson v. Treadwell, the plaintiffs, engaged in the real estate business, 
challenged the validity of the New York regulation permitting cease and 
desist zones on First Amendment grounds.243 
In analyzing each case, the Second Circuit applied the Central Hudson 
framework.244  First, in both cases, neither party disputed that the real estate 
solicitations contained non-misleading commercial speech related to lawful 
activity.245  In NYSAR, the court found that the real estate brokers’ solicitation 
of homeowners constitutes lawful activity and that housing solicitations are 
not per se misleading.246  Similarly, in Anderson, the solicitations contained 
“truthful, non-deceptive information about themselves, the real estate 
market, the nature of their services, and those of their company.”247  Second, 
in each case, the court found the State’s interest to be substantial.  In NYSAR, 
the court ruled that the government had a substantial interest in thwarting 
blockbusting.248  In Anderson, the court found that protecting the privacy of 
residents from harassing solicitation served a substantial government 
interest.249 
The Second Circuit distinguished the two cases when applying the third 
and fourth Central Hudson factors.  In Anderson, the court found that a direct 
relation existed between the restriction and the State’s interest.250  To 
establish a direct connection, the court required the State to show that its 
residents suffered real harm and that the restrictions would alleviate such 
harm “to a material degree.”251  The court found the record sufficiently 
demonstrated that the real estate solicitations caused real harm and that the 
 
 242  N.Y.  State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 835-37 (2d Cir. 1994).  The real 
estate agents brought their constitutional challenge under the First Amendment.  Id. at 835. 
 243  Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 2002).  In Anderson, the plaintiff 
sent a flier to a home owner residing in a solicitation cease and desist zone, asking the home 
owner to contact the plaintiffs if the homeowner wished to sell.  Id. at 459.  The Secretary of 
State deemed the flier to be a solicitation and fined the plaintiffs.  Id.  Subsequently, the 
plaintiffs challenged the validity of the New York law, arguing that the cease and desist zones 
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 459–60. 
 244  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 460–61. 
 245  Id. at 461; N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841. 
 246  N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841. 
 247  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 460. 
 248  N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841. 
 249  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461–62.  The State proffered an additional substantial state 
interest in protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting.  Id. at 461.  Finding the privacy 
interest substantial, the court did not address whether the State had a substantial interest in 
protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting.  Id.  
 250  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461–62.   
 251  Id.  
GILMORE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:17 PM 
2018] COMMENT 499 
cease and desist zones alleviated such harms by a material degree.252 
 
Additionally, in Anderson, the Second Circuit found the restrictions to 
be a reasonable fit.253  The court did not consider the cease and desist zones 
to be over-inclusive since the zones and the registry matched the 
homeowners who suffered the harm.254  The court weighed heavily the fact 
that the zones were a “resident-activated restriction,” meaning the residents 
helped identify the banned areas for solicitations.255  The areas identified as 
cease and desist zones were the same areas where a large numbers of 
homeowners complained about real estate solicitation. 256  Additionally, the 
registry was limited to the homeowners that did not want to be subjected to 
real estate solicitation.257  By this reasoning, the Second Circuit upheld the 
state’s cease and desist zone restrictions banning real estate solicitation.258 
Conversely, in NYSAR, the court found that some evidence of 
blockbusting existed; however, the court struck down the non-solicitation 
ban because the ban was not a reasonable fit compared to the degree of the 
harm.259  The court reasoned that the restriction lacked a reasonable fit since 
a less restrictive measure, such as cease and desist zones, may have just as 
effectively combated the level of blockbusting present.260  The court focused 
on the fact that, despite having cease and desist zones in place before the 
non-solicitation ban, the Secretary failed to prove that a non-solicitation 
order, rather than the resident-activated restrictions, would more effectively 
combat blockbusting.  Therefore, as applied to the real estate agents, the 
court struck such restrictions down.261 
The Second Circuit cases did not create precedent in New Jersey 
because New Jersey is within the Third Circuit.262  The Second Circuit’s 
reasoning, however, is helpful to understand how the Third Circuit would 
apply the Central Hudson framework in determining the constitutionality of 
 
 252  Id. at 462.  In reaching this opinion, the court found the popularity of the program, the 
statements in support of the cease and desist zones at public hearings, and complaints of 
violations to be sufficient to substantiate the harms.  Id. at 462.  Further, the same facts were 
sufficient to establish the harms were alleviated by a material degree as a result of the cease 
and desist zones.  Id. 
 253  Anderson, 294 F.3d at 462–63. 
 254  Id.  
 255  Id. at 462. 
 256  Id. at 462–63. 
 257  Id. 
 258  Id. at 464. 
 259  N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 260  Id. at 844. 
 261  Id.  
 262  See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are not 
bound by precedent from other circuits.”). 
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restricting commercial speech related to real estate solicitation.263  Likewise, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court uses the framework to make similar 
determinations.264  Therefore, the Toms River cease and desist ordinance will 
be considered under the Central Hudson framework. 
Under the Central Hudson framework, a federal or state court is likely 
to uphold the constitutionality of Toms River’s cease and desist ordinance as 
constitutional under the First Amendment.  As in Anderson and NYSAR, the 
application of the first two prongs is relatively straightforward.  To start, the 
speech must be considered commercial speech.265  The speech Toms River 
seeks to curtail is solicitations for the sale of residents’ homes.  This clearly 
constitutes speech advancing a commercial transaction, or speech for the 
economic benefit of the speaker, because it is speech proposing a real estate 
transaction.  Real estate agents are using the speech for their economic 
benefit as agents attempt to solicit the purchase of homes for resale to their 
Orthodox Jewish clients at a profit.  Therefore, because the real estate agents’ 
speech is commercial, the ordinance must satisfy the Central Hudson 
framework. 
Next, the speech being regulated by Toms River neither misleads nor 
relates to illegal activity because the speech is clear and straightforward, and 
regulates more than just speech related to blockbusting.  It is hard to imagine 
either party perpetuating the argument that the speech in question is 
misleading.  As mentioned above, misleading speech is afforded no First 
Amendment rights because it upends the informational aspect of consumer 
advertising.266  Here, there is no advertising.  The speech is explicitly clear—
real estate agents want to buy residents’ homes.  Homeowners certainly 
understand the speech and the transaction it proposes. 
Toms River is likely to argue that the regulated speech relates to illegal 
activity.  Specifically, Toms River will most likely contend that solicitation 
tactics used by real estate agents perpetuate blockbusting, which is an illegal 
activity.  Speech regarding illegal activity is not afforded First Amendment 
protection;267 thus, if the speech is related to blockbusting, Toms River has 
the unfettered right to regulate the speech.  That some of the speech may 
relate to illegal activity, however, does not stop the Central Hudson analysis 
because not all speech governed by the ordinance relates to blockbusting.  
The ordinance pertains to all real estate solicitation in two zones within Toms 
River despite whether the solicitations constitute blockbusting or not.  
 
 263  See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 264  See, e.g., E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment of Franklin, 146 A.3d 623 (N.J. 
2016). 
 265  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 266  Id. at 563–64. 
 267  Id.  
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Therefore, the ordinance is subject to further analysis under the Central 
Hudson framework to determine whether the suppression of commercial 
speech is justified. 
 
 
To be constitutional under Central Hudson, Toms River’s cease and 
desist ordinance must advance a substantial governmental interest.268  
Similar to Anderson and NYSAR, Toms River is likely to proffer that 
substantial interests exist in (1) protecting the privacy of its homeowners, 
and (2) protecting its neighborhoods from being victimized by blockbusting.  
First, the Supreme Court has consistently held that there is a protectable 
privacy interest in the home.269  Thus, there is no doubt that Toms River’s 
protection of its residents’ privacy in their homes is a substantial 
governmental interest.  Second, protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting 
is likely a substantial government interest because it is protecting the 
neighborhood from an illegal activity.  But, Toms River is likely to fail to 
constitutionally justify its ordinance on other grounds.270  Therefore, going 
forward, Toms River’s substantial interest is likely to be protecting its 
residents’ privacy of their homes. 
Next, Toms River must prove the restriction on commercial speech is 
“directly related” to the substantial interest the town holds in protecting the 
privacy of its residents’ homes.  Judging by the evidence, there is little doubt 
that the cease and desist zones are directly related to the residents’ interest 
in the privacy of their homes.  Given the findings in the Toms River report 
and public hearing comments,271 it is evident that the solicitations exposed 
the homeowners’ privacy interests to real harm.  Examples of intrusions of 
the home include: “[d]rive bys” where real estate agents take pictures of 
residents’ homes, frequent and repeated solicitations on weekends and 
holidays, and asking neighborhood children how many bedrooms are in their 
 
 268  See id. at 564. 
 269  See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Strattom, 536 U.S. 150 
(2002); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995); Frisby v. Schiltz, 487 U.S. 
474, 484–85 (1998). 
 270  While protecting Toms River neighborhoods from blockbusting is likely a substantial 
interest, the ordinance would be over-inclusive in achieving that goal because speech relating 
to real estate solicitation, but not related to blockbusting, would also be restricted.  Therefore, 
there would be less intrusive means of restricting speech related to blockbusting without 
restricting speech relating to real estate solicitation.  For example, Toms River already enacted 
an ordinance which outlaws blockbusting.  See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS 
RIVER § 391-51 (2016), http://ecode360.com/30316219.  Therefore, the court would likely 
find the new ordinance over-inclusive and unnecessary to further the substantial governmental 
interest. 
 271  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 11–13. 
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Since the ordinance is Toms River’s third iteration of non-solicitation 
ordinances, this further shows the harms were bona fide.273  This illustrates 
the escalating demand to stop these unwanted and harmful solicitations 
because the original ordinances failed to deter such invasion of privacy since 
real estate solicitations kept occurring even after the first and second 
enactments of the non-solicitation ordinances.  Additionally, the cease and 
desist zones alleviate the harms caused by the solicitations because the most 
frequent and intense solicitations occurred in the two zones where real estate 
solicitations are now banned.274  Consequently, those willing to sell their 
homes in the no-knock zones may put their homes on the market to alert real 
estate agents of their interest or intent to sell their home, instead of real estate 
agents having to knock on every door trying to discern such information. 
Finally, the Central Hudson framework analyzes whether the Toms 
River ordinance is broader than necessary to serve the homeowners’ privacy 
interest in their homes.  The cease and desist zones match the areas where 
residents are experiencing the harm because the cease and desist zones 
encompass the areas and neighborhoods where the most frequent and intense 
real estate solicitations occurred.275  As in Anderson, residents helped create 
the cease and desist zones by identifying the most problematic areas for real 
estate solicitation through their complaints.276 
While the Toms River ordinance resembles the resident-activated 
restriction praised in Anderson, it is important to note that the Toms River 
restriction is different than the Anderson restriction.  Unlike the cease and 
desist zones in Anderson, the cease and desist zone under the Toms River 
ordinance creates a blanket ban for all real estate solicitation in the 
designated area.277  Residents falling within the zone are covered by the 
solicitation ban, without regard to whether they want to be covered by the 
ban.278  This type of ban seems more like the non-solicitation order seen in 
NYSAR than the resident-activated ban in Anderson, thus, possibly leaving 
 
 272  Id. at 13–14. 
 273  See §§ 391-36.1, 391-48–55. 
 274  TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. 
 275  Id. at 14–15. 
 276  Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding resident complaints 
helped identify the banned areas of solicitation). 
 277  § 391-55. 
 278  § 391-55(c)(3). 
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the Toms River ordinance on unstable constitutional grounds. 
Unlike NYSAR’s blanket ban on solicitation, however, residents can opt 
out of the non-solicitation ban by filing an affirmative statement with the 
Township Clerk, asserting their wishes to receive real estate solicitation.279  
Toms River will likely argue that this essentially creates a reverse resident-
activated restriction where the extent of the solicitation ban is defined by 
those opting out of the cease and desist zone, rather than the Anderson 
approach where residents had to opt into the cease and desist zone.  Thus, in 
effect, the Anderson ban and Toms River ban reach the same outcome, just 
through opposite means. 
If Toms River’s ordinance is found to be more like NYSAR than 
Anderson, this does not necessarily mean that the ordinance will be found to 
be unconstitutional.  While the ban in NYSAR was struck down, the court did 
not facially invalidate the law allowing solicitation bans, stating that, under 
different circumstances, it is possible that such a ban would be 
constitutional.280  In light of this, Toms River’s ordinance is distinguishable 
from NYSAR because the town took a different approach before passing the 
solicitation ban. 
For instance, Toms River’s progression to deal with its real estate 
solicitation problem differs from NYSAR.  To start, the Toms River created 
a no-knock registry, which prohibited door-to-door solicitation of enrolled 
residents.281  The original ordinance did not specifically include real estate 
solicitations, and, as a result, residents were subjected to real estate 
solicitations.282  In response to residents’ complaints, the town passed a 
general anti-solicitation ordinance, specifically implicating real estate 
solicitations.283  Still, the problem of real estate solicitation remained 
unabated as evidenced by residents’ complaints.  The final step was passing 
the ordinance that allowed for the creation of cease and desist zones, and the 
ultimate creation of the current cease and desist zones to protect the most 
aggrieved areas of the town.284  While NYSAR started with cease and desist 
orders and escalated to a blanket solicitation ban, the Secretary of State failed 
to provide evidence of the resident-activated restriction’s ineffectiveness.285  
Unlike NYSAR, each of Toms River’s previous efforts to combat real estate 
solicitations proved ineffective as evidenced by the continued complaints of 
residents. 
 
 279  § 391-55(c)(4). 
 280  N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 281  § 391-36.1 (2016), http://ecode360.com/30316219. 
 282  See id.  See also TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. 
 283  §§ 391-48 to -52. 
 284  § 391-55. 
 285  N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 844. 
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Furthermore, in NYSAR, the court took issue with the lack of 
investigation to determine the validity of the residents’ complaints.286  On 
the other hand, Toms River’s solicitation ban was created only after an 
investigation by the Business Administrator and Town Attorney to verify the 
validity of residents’ complaints.287  Therefore, it is unsubstantiated to claim 
the ordinance is over-inclusive or broader than what is necessary to protect 
the homeowners’ privacy interests. 
After applying the Central Hudson framework, the Toms River cease 
and desist zone ordinance restricting real estate solicitation passes 
constitutional muster and should be upheld against a First Amendment 
challenge. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Toms River is dealing with a unique situation.  Its neighbor, Lakewood, 
is in the midst of a population boom created by the exponential growth of its 
Orthodox Jewish community.  With increasing real estate demands and 
decreasing space in Lakewood, Toms River neighborhoods have become the 
site of intense and frequent real estate solicitations as real estate brokers, 
representing Orthodox Jewish clients, attempt to penetrate the housing 
market in these neighborhoods.  The result: tension between Toms River 
residents and the Orthodox Jewish community.  In an attempt to protect the 
interests of its residents, Toms River outlawed real estate solicitation in two 
neighborhoods bordering Lakewood.  The real estate agents affected, 
however, are mainly Orthodox Jews, or represent mainly Orthodox Jewish 
clients, leading to allegations, whether implicit and explicit, of anti-
Semitism. 
Yet, under New Jersey case law,288 Toms River is allowed to enact 
ordinances to prevent blockbusting.  While critics may argue that Toms 
River admitted blockbusting is not prevalent throughout the town, the intense 
and frequent real estate solicitations experienced by certain Toms River 
residents is the exact behavior the federal289 and state290 laws outlaw and it 
is essential for Toms River to halt the practice before it becomes prevalent 
throughout the town. 
Further, as a restriction on commercial speech, Toms River’s ordinance 
seems to be constitutional as viewed through the Central Hudson framework.  
Toms River acted within its power to create resident-activated cease and 
desist zones because it is protecting a substantial state interest in the privacy 
 
 286  Id. at 843. 
 287  See TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3–14. 
 288  See Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 765–66 (N.J. 1969). 
 289  42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012). 
 290  N.J. STAT. ANN 10:5–12(k) (2017). 
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of Toms River residents’ homes, directly alleviating the problem of real 
estate solicitation, and the restriction is no broader than necessary.  
Therefore, Toms River’s ordinance does not violate the First Amendment 
rights of real estate brokers, and it is within the town’s authority to curtail 
solicitations as commercial speech. 
By enacting this ordinance, Toms River is not closing its doors on the 
Orthodox Jewish community.  If Toms River residents list their homes on 
the market for sale, nothing prevents those in the Orthodox Jewish 
community from purchasing houses within the cease and desist zones.  
Unquestionably, though, Toms River is slamming the door on real estate 
brokers’ use of aggressive and intimidating tactics. 
 
